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Abstract  
This study used survival analysis to establish the determinants of the hazard for bank liquidation of government 
securities in order to identify possible measures to limit the occurrence of liquidation. The findings showed that 
increases in capital lead to declines in the rediscounting hazard and increases in the liquidation hazard of using 
securities as collateral for borrowing from the Central Bank. Both primary dealership and the spread increased 
the hazard for rediscounting securities and reduced the hazard for liquidating securities through their use as 
collateral. Measures to minimize liquidity shortages in the interbank market and development of the secondary 
market are recommended for the reduction of liquidation of issued securities. 
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1. Introduction  
Understanding why some banks liquidate their securities is important given much reliance by Government and 
the Central Bank on securities for conducting fiscal policy and influencing monetary policy respectively. For 
instance, if it is the practice of a bank to reallocate its assets between securities and loans or cash on the basis of 
liquidity considerations, then the Central Bank’s prediction of bank behavior would need to focus more on bank 
liquidity indicators. On the other hand if the reallocation were to be for the most part explained by profit 
motives, then the Central Bank’s predictions of bank behavior would have to focus more on bank profitability 
indicators. Similarly, the stability of domestic financing through issuance of Government securities can 
significantly be affected by large liquidations which can compromise budget execution. This underscores the 
importance of the ability of both the Central Bank and fiscal authority to predict banks reactions to both 
monetary policy and fiscal financing needs. In addition, since the secondary market in Uganda is still growing, it 
is likely that liquidation of securities will remain an important option for holders of securities that urgently 
require funds.  
Most of the analysis on the liquidation of securities held by banks focuses on the amount of securities that are 
liquidated as the dependent variable. However, as noted by [1], it is also useful to understand bank habits and 
characteristics which influence the frequency of liquidation of securities. Factors influencing the frequency of 
liquidation could provide additional insights that may be missed if the dependent variable is a nominal quantity. 
In addition, understanding determinants of the duration of Government securities held by banks can be useful 
for ascertaining the ideal distribution of securities by maturity to be issued. Such analysis requires the use of 
duration models, which although have their background in analytical studies in the fields of industrial 
engineering and biomedical sciences, have over time gained prominence in addressing special economic event 
problems. 
This paper therefore, investigates the factors that influence the duration of Government securities liquidated by 
banks. The duration of Government securities may be shortened through a sale of the security to the BOU or 
provision of the security to BOU as collateral. In either case, the holder exchanges the security for cash from 
BOU. Attributes of the securities and holders of the securities should therefore be important factors that 
influence the duration of securities. Subsequently, the following potential hypotheses were investigated: 
• Primary dealership of a bank results in a shorter duration of Government securities held by the bank 
• Foreign ownership of a bank results in a longer duration of Government securities held by the bank  
• Increase in bank capitalization results in a longer duration of the Government securities held by the banks  
The rest of the paper reviews the literature on the determinants of duration of securities, describes the data and 
methodology used for the study, and presents the results and discussion of the results and the conclusions 
emerging from the findings.  
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2. Literature review 
Reference [2] provides a detailed review of some of the applications of duration analysis to economic problems. 
However, in the field of finance, duration analysis has for the most part been applied to problems of trades in 
financial markets and debt default and prepayment. On default and prepayment of debt, studies that have been 
conducted include identifying the determinants of mortgage default or prepayment, and corporate bond default 
[3,4,5]). On trades in financial markets, studies have assessed whether behavioral biases exist among investors 
[6,7]. Other studies have used duration analysis to analyze bank relationships [8,9]. The studies on the duration 
of bank relationships are of particular interest to this study given the similarity between bank-borrower 
relationships in such studies with bank-Central Bank liquidation relationships. Reference [8] analyzed bank 
relationships with firms focusing on the willingness and ability for terminations of relationships by Norwegian 
firms between 1979 and 1995. The study tracked firm’s relationships with banks from when they started to 
when they ended the relationships and when they switched to other banks. More importantly, the study 
employed hazard function estimation to infer the determinants of each relationship’s duration. The explanatory 
variables included firm characteristics and financial information such as sales, age, profitability, Tobin’s Q, 
leverage, multiple relationship dummies and ownership concentration. The study found that small, young and 
highly leveraged firms maintained the shortest relationships. 
Reference [9] studied interbank relationships using 11 years of monthly bank data for Italian banks. The analysis 
was based on a duration model of bank-bank relationships defined as the period from when a bank lends for the 
first time to another bank or borrows from it, to when the interbank exposure dries up. The hazard model used 
incorporated both lending and borrowing banks characteristics. The characteristics included among others 
borrowers and lenders size, capital, bad loans, income structure, return on investment, rating, liquidity situation, 
and volatility of liquidity. The study found that interbank relationships were longer where borrowing banks were 
illiquid, small, unrated, and involved in large lending to non-banks. On the other hand, for lenders, relationships 
were durable if they were liquid, well capitalized and less heavily engaged in other kinds of business. The 
borrower’s characteristics that affected relationships as identified by [9,8], are of interest in this study. This is 
because, borrowers or borrower banks can be regarded to be synonymous with banks that hold securities and 
liquidate them while lending banks would be synonymous with the Central Bank which can accept securities 
offered as collateral in return for loan extension to banks. Looked at from this perspective, some parallels can be 
drawn from the determinants highlighted in the respective studies for investigation in this study. 
Other studies that have applied survival analysis methods in the field of finance investigated the determinants of 
survival of hedge funds [10,11,12]. These studies are quite similar to this study in the sense that they 
investigated the determinants of survival of a financial instrument in this case hedge funds while this study 
investigates the determinants of survival of treasury securities which are also a financial instrument. Reference 
[12] examined the factors that influence the duration of individual hedge funds in the Lipper Trading Advise 
Selection System database. The study considered attributes such as return on properties, investment strategies, 
fund size, competitive pressure, funds flows, drawdown, leverage, incentive scheme, liquidity constraints and 
minimum investment amount. The methodology used included the non-parametric Kaplan-Meier (KM) analysis, 
Cox proportional hazard model and panel logit model. The study found that funds with higher returns, assets 
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under management, recent fund flows and funds with lower volatilities and higher skewness of returns had 
higher survival probabilities. The study also found that incentive schemes mattered, for survival for instance 
funds with higher incentive fees had lower survival. In addition, funds that had a longer redemption notice 
period and a lower redemption frequency had higher survival probabilities.  
Reference [11] also studied the effects of fund-specific characteristics such as age, assets under management, 
current and lagged returns and flows to and out of the funds on the likelihood of liquidation for the funds. They 
found that age, assets under management, cumulative returns and fund flows increased liquidation probability. 
Reference [10] applied a Cox semi-parametric hazard model and found that hedge funds which had negative 
returns for two consecutive years had a higher risk of closing down. The different studies demonstrated the 
suitability of survival analysis methods for determining the effects of numerous variables on the duration of 
financial instruments. However, the focus of the studies conducted by [10,11,12] was mainly on the role of the 
financial instruments’ characteristics on its survival. This contrasts with the focus of this study which is on the 
characteristics of the holders of the financial instruments on its survival.  
One study that was found to have focused on the characteristics of the holders of financial instruments on the 
survival of the respective financial instruments is by [1]. The study investigated the reasons behind the reduced 
need for liquidation of securities among 246 banks in the USA using the elapsed time between successive visits 
over the weeks from January 1981 through December 1995. A survivor function was estimated for individual 
bank borrowers on the elapsed time measured in weeks between successive borrowings from the discount 
window. The estimation was done using accelerated failure time models on account of their flexibility in 
defining the underlying distribution and related hazard function. The main focus of the study was to show that 
financial risk factors prompted banks to avoid the discount window. In addition, the model used also controlled 
for other critical variables that influence bank borrowing including variables capturing conditions in the money 
markets (the federal funds-discount rate spread and the federal funds-repo rate spread), and the effect of rate 
expectations measured by the expected change in the federal funds spread. The effects of financial conditions 
were measured using the average Standard and Poor's credit rating of banks as the primary measure and the 
Salomon Brothers 35-bank holding company stock return index as the secondary measure. 
In addition to applying a unique methodological approach to measure bank reluctance to borrowing from the 
discount window on the basis of elapsed time between successive borrowings, [1] also controlled explicitly for 
heterogeneity among the banks. The variables that were used included capital strength of the borrowing 
institution measured as the share of equity to total assets and size of banks measured using the logarithm of 
banks assets.  The size variable was included to control for the effect of non-price rules that enable small banks 
to borrow more frequently. Further, dummy variables for each quarter were used to control for seasonal 
variation in adjustment borrowing. The study also tested the effect of banks’ capacity to manage reserves using 
the coefficient of variation of reserve liabilities. The findings of the study suggested that the growing reluctance 
to borrow by banks stemmed from the deteriorating financial position of banks during the period of analysis. In 
particular, banks avoided the discount window because they feared that market participants would interpret their 
visits as a signal of serious funding difficulties. 
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This study is largely informed by the work of [1] but adds three new dimensions to the analysis. Firstly, [1] 
applied parametric models for estimation of duration which although is simple to use may distort the hazard 
rates as they impose much structure on the data. This study used Cox’s approach to the proportional hazard 
model which is semi-parametric, imposes fewer restrictions and is thus likely to provide a more accurate 
representation. Nonetheless, parametric models were also estimated although their use was mainly for 
comparison purposes. Secondly, the study modelled rediscounting and borrowing against securities as collateral 
simultaneously in a competing risks model. As noted earlier, banks can liquidate securities held through two 
main ways. The first is a simple and outright sale of the security to the Central Bank also known as 
rediscounting. The second method is to offer the security as collateral against borrowing from the Central Bank. 
This study also attempted to investigate whether the influence of the different determinants of the duration of 
securities varied for the different methods of liquidation.  
Thirdly, the study investigated the effects of additional factors not considered by previous studies such as 
primary dealership and ownership of banks. Through their role as market makers, primary dealer banks are 
required to continuously quote bid/ask prices with a predetermined spread or less for a prescribed trading lot on 
a firm basis. For this role, they receive in exchange the privilege of exclusively bidding for and distributing new 
issues of Government securities [13]. Primary dealers may therefore find themselves with more securities than 
they require for their own investment purposes especially when liquidity in the secondary market is constrained. 
This would imply that primary dealer banks may have a higher likelihood of liquidating securities especially 
during phases of tight liquidity. In addition, [14] noted that primary dealers may be forced to sell their securities 
if they cannot access borrowing against securities as collateral. The tight liquidity conditions in the USA during 
the two weeks prior to March 16, 2008 were cited as having significantly affected dealers in the USA resulting 
in the creation of a Primary Dealers Credit Facility to alleviate funding pressures on primary dealers. In the case 
of Uganda, the non-existence of such a facility implies that primary dealers are more likely to be constrained 
during tight liquidity conditions forcing them to liquidate securities. As noted by [14], the existence of such a 
facility (primary Dealers Credit Facility) may be a critical recourse for primary dealers during tight market 
conditions as was observed during the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in 2008.  
The importance of controlling for bank ownership stems from the arguments that foreign banks when compared 
to local banks tend to have better access to funds due to a more diversified funding base [15]. In addition, 
foreign banks have also been associated with improved efficiency. For instance, [16] concluded that foreign 
bank entry in Latin America was associated with a reduction in the profit margins and increased efficiency. 
Reference [17] came to similar conclusions on better efficiency and access to funding available to foreign banks. 
The conclusions were linked to the higher average loan growth, higher average provisioning expense, and 
greater loss-absorption capacity. Given that foreign banks are likely to have better access to funding and higher 
efficiency, it is expected that the likelihood of liquidating securities reduces if a bank is foreign owned.  
The study also due to the absence of measures for all banks in Uganda based on credit ratings and stock return 
indices for determining the financial conditions used alternative proxies comprised of reserve adequacy and 
profitability respectively.  
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3. Data description and methodology 
3.1. Data description 
The data used for the analysis comprised of 2,074 securities which were rediscounted between June 2006 and 
December 2012 among 11 banks. The 11 banks were selected on the basis of having been operational in each of 
the six and half years of the study period (from June 2006 to December 2012). Liquidation of securities over the 
period occurred on different days but the data on the covariates was measured on a monthly basis. There was 
therefore no practical way for measuring the influence of the different covariates on the duration measured in 
days between issuance and the failure event without modifying the duration. Subsequently, the duration was 
modified from days to months by dividing the number of days by 30 and rounding up. The covariates considered 
included dummy variables for primary dealership indicating whether the holder of the security was a primary 
dealer bank or not; ownership of the bank indicating whether the bank was foreign owned or not; and security 
type indicating whether the security liquidated was a treasury bill or a treasury bond. Bank ownership was based 
on majority ownership criteria with banks classified as foreign owned if more than 50 percent of the shares were 
owned by non-residents. The size variable was determined on the basis of individual banks’ loan assets and 
deposit liabilities. The distribution of the banks by ownership, size and dealership status is as shown in Figure 1. 
The sample had 9 foreign banks and 2 local banks of which 4 were large and 7 were small based on deposits. In 
addition, 4 of the banks were primary dealers and 7 were non-primary dealers.  
 
Figure 1: Distribution of banks by ownership, size and primary dealership status 
Besides the dummy variables, sometime-varying covariates were used in the analysis consisting of a measure of 
the opportunity cost of holding securities, capitalization, deposit liabilities, loan assets, and reserve adequacy. 
The opportunity cost of holding securities was measured as the spread between the monthly average 7 day 
interbank rate which is the rate at which banks lend to each other and the rediscount rate. On average, the 7-day 
interbank rate was lower than the rediscount rate by 282 basis points reflecting the punitive nature of the 
rediscount rate. However, as shown by the maximum value of the spread, there were instances when funds in the 
interbank market dried up to the extent of the interbank rate exceeding the rediscount up to a maximum of 222 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
foreign local large small primary dealer non-primary
dealer
ownership size dealership
346 
 
International Journal of Sciences: Basic and Applied Research (IJSBAR) (2015) Volume 22, No  2, pp 341-362 
basis points during the period of analysis. Overall, there were three months (July 2009, January 2012 and March 
2012) when the interbank rate exceeded the rediscount rate.  In the 2012 period, the BOU had commenced 
easing after having hiked interest rates to curb inflation. The July 2009 high interbank rate could have been 
associated with the usual beginning of financial year tight liquidity conditions associated with delays in the 
release of funds to Government agencies as Government waits for parliamentary approval of the budget.  
 
Figure 2: Evolution of the rediscount and interbank rates and the spread between the rediscount and interbank 
rates (percent) 
Capitalization was measured as the ratio of tier 1 capital to total assets. Deposit liabilities were measured as the 
ratio of deposits to total liabilities and loan assets were measured as the ratio of loans to total assets. On average, 
most of the liability side of bank’s balance sheets was comprised of deposits estimated at 71 percent of the total. 
Reserve adequacy was measured as the ratio of reserves to assets. As shown in Table 1, bank’s reserves 
comprised on average about 9 percent of total assets and they ranged between 4 percent and 16 percent.  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the time-varying determinants of bank securities’ survival time 
Variable      Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Spread -2.82 2.5446 -9.69 2.22 
Capitalization 0.09 0.0300 0.04 0.39 
Deposit liabilities 0.71 0.1122 0.22 0.85 
Loan assets 0.41 0.1017 0.18 0.60 
Reserves 0.09 0.0264 0.04 0.16 
Source: Author’s computations 
The dependent variable was the survival time of liquidated securities. The Kaplan Meier (KM) survival 
estimates show the survival rate of liquidated securities over time in Figure 3. As shown by the figure, the 
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survival rate of liquidated securities past 5 months is about 75 percent. The survival rate falls fairly fast to about 
50 percent beyond 10 months and then falls at a slower pace to about 35 percent past 15 months and 25 percent 
past 20 months. There are no surviving securities beyond 47 months.  
 
Figure 3: KM survival estimate of securities 
 
3.2. Methodology 
The variable of interest is the duration of securities defined as the length of time or spell that elapses from 
issuance of the security until it is liquidated. The observations are therefore comprised of durations t1, … , tnwhich are based on the time to liquidation. A hazard function can be estimated to establish the 
determinants of the rate at which spells are completed after time t +Δt (i.e. the security is liquidated at time t 
+Δt) given that they last until T (they have been held until time T). 
3.2.1. Cox proportional hazard model  
The hazard function used for the analysis was modelled first as a Cox Proportional Hazards model [18] with the 
hazard taking the form  
h(t) = ho(t)exp (β1x1 + ⋯+ βkxK)      (1)  
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ho(t)  is the baseline hazard and β1, … , βk are the coefficients of the respective k covariates x1, … xk.   For 
purposes of analysis the coefficients as opposed to hazard ratios were reported. The covariates included in 
Equation (1) were primary dealership which takes on a value of 1 if the security was liquidated by a primary 
dealer or 0 if not, ownership which takes on a value of 1 if the security was rediscounted by a bank that is 
foreign owned and 0 otherwise and security type which takes on a value of 1 if the security liquidated was a 
treasury bill and 0 if it was a treasury bond. Banks, whose majority shareholders were foreign, were classified as 
foreign owned banks. 
The variables reflecting primary dealership status, ownership and type of securities remained unchanged during 
the analysis period. However, other variables considered varied over the period of analysis. For such variables, 
the hazard ratio may not be constant over the period of analysis and as a result the proportional hazards 
assumption may be violated. Subject to the proportional hazards test results, the Cox proportional hazards model 
was modified to include time dependent variables as follows: 
h(t) = ho(t)exp {β1x1 + ⋯+ βkxK + g(t)(Υ1z1 + ⋯+ Υmzm)}   (2) 
where z1, … , zm  are m time-varying covariates and Υ1, … ,Υm  are the coefficients for the covariates g(t)(z1), … , g(t)(zm) that are a function of current time. The time varying covariates included in the model 
were profitability, capitalization, deposit liabilities, loan assets, and the opportunity cost of holding securities. 
3.2.2. Accelerated failure time models 
In addition to semi-parametric estimation using the Cox proportional hazards model, accelerated failure time 
models were estimated for comparison. In the accelerated failure time models, the natural logarithm of survival 
time tjis modelled as a linear function of the covariates and takes the following form:  
log�tj� = xjβ + zj        (3) 
where xj is a vector of covariates, β is a vector of regression coefficients, and zj is the error with density f(·). 
The distributional form of the error term determines the regression model. If f(·) is the normal density, then the 
lognormal regression model is obtained; if f(·) is the logistic density, then the log logistic regression model is 
obtained and if f(·) is the extreme-value density, then the exponential and the Weibull regression models are 
obtained.  
3.2.3. Competing risks model 
To address the competing risks among the alternative options for liquidating securities, the method used by [19] 
to estimate competing risks regressions was used. The method used by [19] was selected for modelling 
competing risks because it is easy to see the effects of the covariates compared to the alternative of using the 
cumulative incidence function.  In the formulation, consider the hazard for the event of interest, h1(t), and that 
for the competing event, h2(t). Both hazards can be estimated from available data and when combined form the 
total hazard that any event will occur equal to h(t) = h1(t) + h2(t). As risk accumulates according to h(t), 
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event times T are observed. Whether these events turn out to be failures of interest (Type 1) or competing events 
(Type 2) is determined by the two component hazards at that precise time. [19] specified a model of the hazard 
for the sub-distribution formally defined for failure Type 1 as  
h�1(t) = limδ⟶0 �P(t<T≤t+δ and event type 1)|T>t or(T≤t and not event type 1)δ �    (4) 
The cumulative incidence function can be obtained as  
CIF1(t) = 1 − exp {−H�1(t)}       (5) 
where H�1(t) = ∫ h�1(t)dtt0  is the cumulative sub-hazard. 
The model for the hazard of the sub-distribution is semi-parametric since the baseline sub-hazard h�1,0(t) (i.e. for 
covariates set at zero) is unspecified while the effects of the covariates x are assumed to be proportional. 
h�1(t|x) = h�1,0(t)exp (xβ)        (6) 
Estimation of Equation (6) provides estimates of β or exponentiated coefficients that are sub-hazard ratios. 
Positive values mean that the effect of increasing the respective covariate is to increase the sub-hazard and thus 
increase the cumulative incidence function across the board. 
 Before estimating the Cox Proportional Hazards model, the Schoenfelds residual test was conducted to 
establish whether the explanatory variables observed the proportional hazards assumption. Comparisons were 
also made between the different accelerated failure time models estimated to identify the model with the best fit 
using the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) and the Log-likelihood estimates. 
4. Results 
From the data used, the total incidence rate for liquidation of securities was estimated at 0.08 and the 
distribution of survival time indicated a median survival time of 11 months.  A summary of the survival time is 
shown in Table 2. 
Table 2: Summary statistics of survival time 
 Time at risk Incidence rate Number of subjects Survival time 
25% 50% 75% 
Total 27,190 0.08 2,074 7 11 21 
Source: Author’s computations 
The test used to evaluate whether the proportional hazards assumption was valid involved testing of the nonzero 
slope in a generalized linear regression of the scaled Schoenfeld residuals on time [20]. The null hypothesis of 
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the test is equivalent to testing that the log hazard ratio function is constant over time. The rejection of the null 
hypothesis indicates a violation of the proportional-hazards assumption. 
Table 3: Schoenfelds residual test for the proportional hazards assumption 
  Rho Chi2 df Prob > Chi2 
Primary dealership -0.029* 1.65 1 0.199 
Foreign ownership -0.028* 1.37 1 0.241 
Security type 0.099 27.11 1 0.000 
Capital adequacy -0.023* 1.17 1 0.279 
Deposit size 0.129 37.74 1 0.000 
Loan size 0.039 3.63 1 0.056 
Reserve adequacy 0.046 3.64 1 0.056 
Spread 0.002* 0.01 1 0.923 
Source: Author’s computations  
Notes: * indicates that the variable does not violate the Cox proportional hazards assumption 
The test results as shown in Table 3 indicate that the proportional hazards assumption was not violated by four 
variables (primary dealership, foreign ownership, capital adequacy and the spread between the interest rate and 
the rediscount rate) out of the nine identified variables for the model. The other 4 variables (type of security, 
deposit size, loan size, and reserve adequacy) violated the proportional hazards assumption.  
4.1. Determinants of duration using the Cox proportional hazard model  
Since the proportional hazards assumption was violated by five of the nine explanatory variables, a cox 
proportional hazards model was estimated in which the variables that violated the proportional hazards 
assumption were included as time varying covariates. In addition, although the capital adequacy variable did not 
violate the proportional hazard assumption, it was included in the model together with the other time varying 
covariates since it is known that capital changes did occur during the period of analysis. The results of the Cox 
proportional hazards model with time varying covariates are as shown in Table 4.  
The results showed that primary dealership significantly reduces the risk of liquidation of securities. The 
duration of securities increases by 0.30 percent when they are held by banks that are also primary dealers. 
However, this result is contrary to conventional wisdom since the expectation is that primary dealers may hold 
more securities than they actually require for their own purposes as they have to take on the role of market 
makers. It would therefore be expected that primary dealers rediscount or borrow against securities bought for 
market making purposes which are not taken up by the market. The result of an increasing duration of securities 
where holders are primary dealers is therefore surprising.   
Similarly, an increase in the spread between the rediscount and market interest rate leads to an increase in the 
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duration of a security of 0.07 percent. Again this result is strange since the expectation is for the holder of a 
security to liquidate it if the opportunity cost of holding it increases. Therefore, the duration of a security should 
reduce as the spread increases. The effects of these two determinants are revisited under alternative 
specifications that follow.  
Table 4: Cox proportional hazards model for the determinants of the duration of securities 
 
Estimates with Robust  
standard errors 
Main variables  
Primary dealership -0.30 
 
[0.0608]*** 
Foreign ownership 0.16 
 [0.0633]** 
Spread -0.07 
 [0.0086]*** 
Security type 2.08 
 [0.0703]*** 
Time varying covariates  
Capital adequacy -0.35 
 [0.0576]*** 
Loan size 0.05 
 [0.0188]** 
Deposit size 0.02 
 [0.0161] 
Reserve adequacy -0.002 
 [0.0470] 
No. of observations 2074 
Log likelihood  -13359.58 
Source: Author’s computations 
Notes: Coefficients and not hazard ratios are reported. Robust standard errors are reported in the parenthesis; * 
is significant at 10 percent; ** is significant at 5 percent; and *** is significant at 1 percent. 
 
The findings showed that foreign ownership of a bank reduced the duration of a security. The duration of 
securities held by foreign banks fell by 0.16 percent. This is also another unexpected result given that foreign 
banks tend to have better access to funds through their large international networks and are generally well 
capitalized. They are also able and indeed tend to attract and retain experienced and better skilled staff in their 
treasury departments to manage their funds more efficiently compared to domestic banks. These two factors 
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would be expected to contribute to the reduced need for liquidation of securities among foreign owned banks 
and thus result in an increase in the duration of securities held by foreign banks. 
The findings also indicated that the duration of securities reduced if the securities were treasury bills. This result 
is consistent with the expectation of securities with shorter maturities having a higher likelihood of liquidation 
compared to those with longer maturities. In addition, the regulatory requirement for liquidation of securities 
through rediscounting only if they have 91 days or less left to maturity makes shorter term securities more 
readily available to banks for rediscounting purposes when the need arises.   
Other findings from the estimation were consistent with the theoretical expectations. For instance, an increase in 
the capital adequacy of banks leads to an increase in the duration of securities. The results indicate that an 
increase in capital adequacy of one percent leads to an increase in the duration of securities of 0.35 percent. This 
result supports the argument that banks with sufficient capital are less likely to face funding shortages that 
would necessitate the liquidation of some of their assets including securities. Therefore it would be expected that 
the duration of securities increases as capital adequacy increases.  
An increase in the share of loans to a bank’s total assets reduces the duration of a security. The estimates show 
that an increase of 1 percent in the loan assets of a bank reduces the duration of its securities by 0.05 percent. 
Indeed it is expected that as loan assets of a bank increase, the risk of default or delayed repayments increases 
which puts pressure on its liquidity management. The result could also mean that banks may liquidate some of 
their securities to meet loan demand. The two factors would have the effect of lowering the duration of 
securities as loan assets rise.  
The results did not provide any evidence in support of significant effects of changes in bank’s deposits and 
reserves on the duration of the securities. Theoretically, it is expected that these covariates should be important 
determinants of the duration of securities given their implications on a bank’s asset and liquidity management 
and generally its financial condition. The absence of significant effects of the two variables (deposits and 
reserves) is also revisited under alternative specifications in the sections that follow.  
4.2. Determinants of survival time using accelerated failure time models 
The influence of some important variables on the duration of securities such as the reserve adequacy, share of 
deposits to total liabilities and profitability could not be determined from the Cox Proportional Hazard models. 
However, the three variables are important for the day-to-day management of a bank as they affect its liquidity 
needs and asset allocation. In addition, some of the findings from the Cox proportional hazards model such as 
the effect of primary dealership, foreign ownership, and spread were counter intuitive.  Alternative models 
based on parametric specification were subsequently estimated to establish whether the results would get 
altered. The accelerated failure time models estimated included the Exponential, Weibull, Log-normal and Log-
logistic distributions. Table 5 shows the coefficients presented in accelerated failure time form. 
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Table 5: Accelerated failure time models for the determinants of survival time of securities 
Variable Exponential Weibull Lognormal Log logistic 
Primary dealership 0.02 0.07 -0.09 -0.01 
 [0.0429] [0.0316]** [0.0584] [0.0620] 
Foreign ownership 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 
 [0.0430] [0.0304] [0.0591] [0.0637] 
Spread 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 
 [0.0043]*** [0.0035]*** [0.0058]*** [0.0052]*** 
Security type -0.97 -0.99 -0.95 -0.95 
 [0.0256]*** [0.0214]*** [0.0351]*** [0.0308]*** 
Capital adequacy 1.06 1.51 -0.02 1.08 
 [0.5347]** [0.3709]*** [0.7125] [0.7853] 
Loan size -0.51 -0.54 -0.42 -0.55 
 [0.1346]*** [0.1117]*** [0.1754] [0.1671]*** 
Deposit size 0.81 0.54 1.08 1.11 
 [0.1385]*** [0.1211]*** [0.1727]*** [0.1715]*** 
Reserve adequacy -0.56 -0.87 0.27 -0.48 
 [0.4557] [0.3705]** [0.6310] [0.5704] 
Constant 2.58 2.84 2.29 2.32 
 [0.1205]*** [0.1096]*** [0.1546]*** [0.1457]*** 
No. of observations 2074 2074 2074 2074 
Log likelihood  -2418.33 -1721.96 -2089.86 -1995.22 
AIC 4854.60 3464.88 4179.6 3998.74 
Source: Author’s computations  
Notes: Robust standard errors are used for all models and are reported in parenthesis; * is significant at 10 
percent; ** is significant at 5 percent; and *** is significant at 1 percent. The coefficients are presented in 
accelerated failure time form. 
 
The results did not vary significantly between the different models, although some variables that were 
significant in the Weibull distribution model were not in the other models. In addition, the findings were for the 
most part similar to those based on the Cox proportional hazards model. For discussion purposes, an assessment 
of the different models was done to determine the best model. Based on the log-likelihood estimate, the largest 
value was for the Weibull model. In addition, the AIC indicated that the Weibull model had the best fit as it had 
the lowest AIC value. The discussion of the parametric estimates was therefore based on the results from the 
Weibull model. 
The estimates from the Weibull model show that primary dealership increases the survival time of a security. 
This finding is consistent with the result from the Cox proportional hazards model. In addition, an increase in 
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the spread leads to an increase in the survival time of a security. Similarly, an increase in a bank’s capital leads 
to an increase in the duration of a security. On the other hand, survival time is reduced if a security is a treasury 
bill. Further, increases in loan assets of banks lead to a decrease in the duration of the securities. All of these 
findings are comparable to those obtained using the Cox proportional hazards model.  
However, results from the Weibull model did not provide any evidence in support of significant effects of 
foreign ownership on the survival time of securities contrary to the results from the Cox proportional hazards 
model. Nonetheless, the Weibull model unlike the Cox proportional hazards model, found significant effects of 
deposit liabilities and reserve assets on the duration of securities. Increases in deposit liabilities result in an 
increase in the survival time of securities. This finding supports the argument that deposits complement 
securities when banks need liquidity. Subsequently, liquidity needs met by raising deposits counter the need to 
liquidate securities increasing their duration. On the other hand, the results indicated that an increase in reserves 
leads to a reduction in the duration of securities. This result is plausible especially where some of the reserves 
are raised using funds obtained by rediscounting securities. However, it should be noted that reserves could be 
raised using alternative sources such as borrowing, mobilizing deposits, and increasing capital. Further, the 
estimates do not show any evidence of a significant effect of profitability on the survival time of securities.  
4.3. Determinants of survival time using a competing risks model 
Given some of the contradicting results relative to theoretical expectations and between the parametric and Cox 
proportional hazards models, additional analysis was done. The additional analysis was conducted using a 
competing risks model in which the liquidation of a security through its use as collateral for borrowing was 
treated as a competing risk to rediscounting. The competing risks model was used to estimate the sub-hazard 
function for the rediscounting failure event as well as the use of a security as collateral failure event. Figures 4 
and 5 show the KM survival estimates for the competing risks.  
A comparison of Figures 4 and 5 shows that securities face a higher liquidation risk through their use as 
collateral as opposed to rediscounting. For instance 50 percent of the securities survive the sub-hazard of 
rediscounting up to 34 months compared to survival up to only 15 months against the sub-hazard risk of use of 
securities as collateral. The higher hazard rates for securities on account of their use as collateral demonstrates 
commercial bank’s preference of this method for liquidation.  
Table 6 shows the estimates obtained from the competing risks model. The competing risk for the estimates 
provided in the first column of the table is the event of using securities as collateral while in the second column, 
rediscounting is the competing failure event. The results in the first column show that foreign ownership of a 
bank, type of security and capital adequacy have the same effect on the rediscounting hazard as that shown by 
the Cox proportional hazards model.  
However, there are a number of results shown by the competing risks model in column 1 that differ from those 
indicated by both the Cox proportional hazards model and the Weibull model. These include results on the 
effects of primary dealership, spread, and reserve adequacy on the duration of securities. Primary dealership 
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results in an increase in the rediscounting hazard of securities under the competing risks model. It is consistent 
with the theoretical expectation of an increase in the rediscounting hazard for banks that are primary dealers 
especially in shallow markets or when liquidity is tight.  
 
Figure 4: KM survival estimates for the rediscounting sub-hazard 
 
 
Figure 5: KM survival estimates for the sub-hazard of use of securities as collateral 
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Table 6: Competing risks model estimates of determinants of survival time of securities 
 
Competing Event: 
Securities are  
offered as collateral 
Competing Event: 
Securities are 
rediscounted 
Main variables   
Primary dealership 0.56 -0.22 
 
[0.1782]*** [0.1033]** 
Foreign ownership 1.02 0.12 
 [0.2192]*** [0.1186] 
Spread 0.10 -0.07 
 [0.0180]*** [0.0089]*** 
Security type 1.96 -0.34 
 [0.1166]*** [0.0656]*** 
Time varying covariates   
Capital adequacy -0.43 0.40 
 [0.1998]** [0.0767]*** 
Loan size 0.04 0.10 
 [0.0346] [0.0195] 
Deposit size -0.07 0.04 
 [0.0513] [0.0189]** 
Reserve adequacy 0.55 -0.15 
 [0.1406]*** [0.0671]** 
No. of observations 2074 2074 
Log likelihood  -3865.36 -10731.92 
Source: Author’s computations  
Notes: Coefficients and not hazard ratios are reported. Robust standard errors are reported in the parenthesis; * 
is significant at 10 percent; ** is significant at 5 percent; and *** is significant at 1 percent. 
 
Additionally, an increase in the spread results in an increase in the rediscounting hazard. This result is also 
consistent with the theoretical argument that an increase in the spread increases the opportunity cost of holding 
onto the security. Thus as this opportunity cost increases, the securities are rediscounted to invest the funds in 
alternative investments with higher returns which lessens the duration of the securities. For reserves, the Cox 
proportional hazard model failed to find any evidence of a significant effect of reserves on the duration of 
securities. However, the Weibull model showed that increases in reserves reduced the survival time of 
securities. This finding was confirmed by the competing risks model which showed that an increase in reserves 
adequacy of one percent resulted in a reduction in the duration of securities of 0.55 percent.   
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5. Discussion of results 
The competing risks model showed that the method used for liquidation mattered. The discussion of the results 
therefore considers both the aggregate Cox proportional hazard model and the competing risks model. Being a 
primary dealer bank is associated with a reduced risk of liquidation of securities. This finding contradicts the 
expectation that being a primary dealer bank should increase the likelihood of liquidating securities owing to 
their market making role. However, this contradiction could simply be a reflection of the relatively better 
liquidity positions primary dealer banks. Primary dealer banks are also the largest banks in the banking sector in 
terms of both deposits and loans partly explaining why they tend to have relatively better liquidity and may 
therefore have less need for liquidating securities. Indeed, when a competing risks model was used, the results 
showed that primary dealership increased the risk of liquidation of securities through rediscounting. This 
contrast in the results may be indicative of primary dealer’s sensitivity to liquidity conditions. Under normal 
liquidity conditions, it is unlikely that primary dealer banks would need to rediscount securities as buyers of 
securities would be available or lenders in the interbank willing to lend against the securities as collateral would 
be available. However, under tight liquidity conditions that are systemic, the absence of both buyers of securities 
and lenders against collateral in form of securities may make the liquidation of securities the only option 
available for primary dealers. Overall, the results suggest that primary dealer banks are more likely to liquidate 
their securities through rediscounting. The significance of the effect of primary dealership on rediscounting of 
securities shown by the competing risks model is consistent with the argument that the secondary market may 
not have sufficient liquidity to absorb all securities available for sale.  
Foreign ownership of banks is associated with an increase in the hazard for liquidating securities. This finding is 
the same when a competing risks model is estimated for the hazard of rediscounting securities. However, 
foreign ownership has no significant effect when the hazard for liquidating securities is due to offering securities 
as collateral for borrowing. This suggests that foreign banks are less likely to borrowing from the Central Bank 
compared to domestic owned banks. The result corroborates the argument that networks among foreign owned 
banks including foreign affiliates contribute to improved access to funds for borrowing [17]. The cost of this 
borrowing from affiliates and other networks may also be cheaper compared to borrowing at the Central Bank. 
This may also explain why foreign owned banks would be less likely to liquidate their securities through their 
use as collateral for borrowing from the Central Bank.  
An increase in the spread between the rediscount rate and the interbank lending rates results in an unexpected 
reduction in the overall hazard for liquidating of securities in a Cox proportional hazards model. However, in a 
competing risks model, the results show that the hazard for liquidating securities through their use as collateral 
increases as theoretically expected when the spread increases. The estimate of the coefficient for the effect of 
the spread on rediscounting of securities by banks in Uganda is however lower at 0.07 compared to 0.15 and 
0.54 estimated for banks in the USA before and after 1992 respectively by [1].  The size of the effect 
notwithstanding, the result confirms that profitability is a determinant of rediscounting. The result also suggests 
that there is a cost benefit from liquidating securities by rediscounting compared to liquidation by offering them 
as collateral for borrowing. This is indeed confirmed by the difference in the rediscount and bank rates. The 
rediscount rate is lower than the Bank rate by 100 basis points.  
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The findings also showed that the hazard of liquidation of treasury bills is higher than that of a treasury bonds. 
The competing risks model shows that the increase in the hazard for liquidation of treasury bills relative to 
treasury bonds is valid when the liquidation is through rediscounting. These two results highlight the important 
influence of the regulatory requirement for rediscounting of securities with 91 or fewer days to maturity. The 
regulation essentially puts shorter term securities (treasury bills) at an advantage in terms of liquidation 
compared to longer term securities (treasury bonds).  
Improvements in capital adequacy result in a reduction in the hazard of liquidating a security. This result is 
consistent with the theoretical expectation of the effect of financial strength on the hazard of liquidating 
securities. The finding is also confirmed by the competing risks model for the hazard for rediscounting which 
falls as banks improve their capital positions. This finding confirms the contention that well capitalized banks 
are less likely to face the kind of liquidity shortages that would necessitate liquidating some of their assets. 
However, [1] found that for banks in the USA, increased financial strength contributed to an increase in the 
likelihood of liquidation of securities although this was only limited to large banks. For small and medium 
banks, the effect was not significant.  
The estimates also show that as a bank’s loan assets increases, the hazard for liquidation of securities increases. 
This result is consistent with the loan accommodation theory [21] which hypothesizes that banks liquidate their 
securities to meet loan demand. The result confirms that banks reallocate some of their liquid assets towards 
provision of loans for their clients. However, increased loans also create other challenges such as increased 
volatility of cash flows due to delayed repayments by borrowers and debt default which may require liquidation 
of securities to make up for shortfalls in projected cash flows. In particular, where there is a default, banks are 
required to provision for the attendant losses which may contribute to the need to liquidate securities.     
The aggregate model did not show any effects of deposits and reserves on the hazard for liquidation of 
securities. However, estimates based on the parametric models and the competing risks models showed 
significant effects of these variables on the duration of securities. Besides showing that the effects were 
significant, the results also indicated that the effects were consistent with the theoretical expectations. An 
increase in deposits resulted in a decrease in the hazard for liquidation of securities. This is to be expected given 
that increases in deposits improve the liquidity of banks which in turn reduces the need for liquidating securities. 
Looked at differently, the deposit size of a bank is a reflection of its size and as shown by [1,22], the liquidation 
hazard of securities decreased with the increase in size of a bank. Reference [1] attributed the finding to the 
disincentive for liquidating securities that larger banks faced due to their vulnerability to more market scrutiny 
compared to smaller banks.   
In the case of reserves, the parametric and competing risks models showed that as reserves increase, the hazard 
for liquidating securities increases. There are two possible explanations as to why banks would liquidate their 
securities to meet reserve needs. The first is due to the requirement for increases in reserves to take effect at very 
short notice moreover at the same time for all banks. The Central Bank computes reserve requirements every 
two weeks and all banks are expected to raise the funds required to meet the reserve needs as soon as they take 
effect. Banks therefore have a very small window to raise their reserves to the required level. Access to funds 
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through liquidation of securities may be a fairly quick way to address the shortage. The second reason could be 
associated to the penalties attracted by failure to meet the reserve requirements. Since all banks are required to 
meet their reserves at the same point in time, borrowing from the interbank can be difficult since all banks have 
similar requirements of meeting reserves requirements In such a situation, liquidity is tight and therefore 
foregoing some income on earning assets may be a better alternative to the penalty. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, the determinants of the survival time of securities were investigated. The findings showed that the 
hazard of liquidation of securities varied depending on whether they were rediscounted or used as collateral for 
Central Bank borrowing. Bank’s increases in deposits and capital lead to declines in the rediscounting hazard 
and increases in the liquidation hazard of using securities as collateral for borrowing from the Central Bank. On 
the other hand, improvements in reserve adequacy of banks was associated with an increase in the rediscounting 
hazard and a decrease in the liquidation hazard of using securities as collateral for borrowing from the Central 
Bank. In addition, the influence of bank attributes on the liquidation hazard of securities including whether 
banks are primary dealers or not, and whether they are foreign or domestic owned, depended on the method of 
liquidation. Banks which were primary dealers had a higher hazard for rediscounting and a lower hazard for 
liquidation through use of securities as collateral.  Foreign banks also had a higher hazard for rediscounting and 
a lower hazard for liquidation through use of securities as collateral.  
The varying effects of the determinants for the different methods of liquidation demonstrate the use of different 
methods for different motives. For instance, the results suggest that borrowing against collateral of securities 
was preferred for addressing cyclical liquidity constraints such as falling deposits and capital while rediscounts 
were used to address transient liquidity needs such as reserves shortages. In effect, disinvestment of long-term 
securities is penalized at a higher rate through the bank rate relative to short-term securities 
The findings indicate that bank level measures aimed at minimizing liquidation of securities to reduce the 
impact on fiscal and monetary policy are likely to vary depending on the type of liquidation. Nonetheless, the 
overall hazard for liquidating securities could be reduced by lowering the opportunity cost of holding securities 
which can be achieved through an increase in the rediscount rate whenever it is necessary to tighten liquidity. 
General improvements in bank’s financial strength including increased capital and reserves adequacy and 
efficiency are other important policies that could constrain liquidation of securities. Further, in the presence of 
serious persistent liquidity shortages, banks would still access funds at the bank rate the higher cost 
notwithstanding. It seems that having a lower rediscount rate relative to the bank rate especially where 
government policy is aimed at increasing long-term domestic debt relative to short-term domestic debt could be 
counterproductive. Where it is clear that there is a systemic liquidity crunch, it may be warranted for special 
access to credit at a rate that is equal to the rediscount rate. The limitation of the study was the omission of the 
effect of regulatory policy effects, political and geographical effects in the model due to failure to get relevant 
data. 
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